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Abstract
We study the effects of audits on long run compliance behaviour, using a random audit
program covering more than 53,000 tax returns. We find that audits raise reported tax liabilities
for five years after audit, effects are longer lasting for more stable sources of income, and only
individuals found to have made errors respond to audit. 60-65% of revenue from audit comes
from the change in reporting behaviour. Extending the standard model of rational tax evasion,
we show these results are best explained by information revealed by audits constraining future
misreporting. Together these imply that more resources should be devoted to audits, audit
targeting should account for reporting responses, and performing audits has additional value
beyond merely threatening them.
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1 Introduction
Audits are a widely used public policy tool for reducing corruption (Bobonis et al., 2016; Avis
et al., 2018), improving public service delivery (Zamboni and Litschig, 2018; Lichand et al., 2019;
Gerardino et al., 2020), ensuring environmental standards (Duflo et al., 2013, 2018), and improving
tax compliance (Kleven et al., 2011; Pomeranz, 2015; Asatryan and Peichl, 2017; Bergolo et al.,
2020; Sarin and Summers, 2020; among others). But audits are costly, so determining how many to
do and how best to allocate them are key policy questions (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). In tax,
the standard approach to setting the number of audits is to compare their costs with the expected
missing tax uncovered at audit—the static gain from an audit (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Kolm,
1973; Yitzhaki, 1987; Bloomquist, 2013). However, audits may change taxpayer behaviour. A field
experiment in Denmark, which followed taxpayers for a year after audit, found an increased reported
liability worth 55% of the audit adjustment (Kleven et al., 2011). This suggests that static gains
may understate the total gains from audit. However, without a longer horizon it is hard to know
by how much, or whether this effect is even reversed in subsequent years, as some lab experiments
suggest (Maciejovsky et al., 2007; Kastlunger et al., 2009).
This paper studies the long run effect of tax audits on taxpayer compliance behaviour. We
combine confidential administrative data on the universe of UK tax filers over thirteen years with
a randomised audit programme. We show three main results. First, audits raise subsequent tax
reports, but the effect declines to zero over five to eight years. The aggregate additional revenue
after audit is at least 1.5 times the underpayment found at audit, implying substantially more
resources should be dedicated to audit than a static comparison would suggest. Second, the revenue
gain is longer lasting for more stable income sources. This highlights the importance of dynamics
for targeting audits, as well as for setting their level. Third, using an event study strategy we show
that these effects are driven by individuals who were found to be under-reporting, while there is
no response for those found to have reported correctly. These three results are explained by audits
providing the tax authority with information about a taxpayer’s income at the time of audit. This
makes later misreporting more difficult, particularly for stable income sources.
To estimate the long run effect we exploit a random audit programme run by the UK tax
authority (HM Revenue and Customs, HMRC). Over 53,000 individual tax filers were unconditionally
randomly selected for audit by the programme between 1998/99 and 2008/09, allowing us to address
the common concern that audits are typically targeted towards taxpayers believed to be under-
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reporting. Similar to Denmark (Kleven et al., 2011) and in contrast to the US (Slemrod et al., 2001;
DeBacker et al., 2018; Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2018), taxpayers are not told these audits are
random. This is important as taxpayers may respond differently – likely less – to audits they know
are random, relative to when they think the tax authority is concerned about something on their
return. We combine this audit data with data on the universe of UK self assessment taxpayers –
individuals who self-file taxes rather than having all tax collected via withholding – from 1998/99 to
2011/12. This allows us to follow individuals for many years after audit. For our first identification
strategy we construct a control group for each year of the programme from individuals who could
have been selected for a random audit that year but were not. We then study the difference in
reporting behaviour over time.
Our first result is that dynamic effects are positive and substantial: taxpayers report higher
levels of tax for five to eight years after audit. We see an initial increase, and then steady decline,
in total tax reported over time. By eight years after audit there is no difference in average tax
paid between audited and unaudited taxpayers, though differences are not statistically significant
beyond five years. 60-65% of the total revenue received as a result of audit comes from this change
in reporting behaviour. Taking into account this effect, tax authorities should do many more audits:
accounting for dynamic effects even random audits provide a return equal to 80% of their cost to
the tax authority. Given the recent focus on the value of audits purely as a threat (Slemrod et al.,
2001; Fellner et al., 2013; Dwenger et al., 2016; Mascagni, 2018; Bergolo et al., 2020; Lichand et al.,
2019), this highlights a benefit of actually performing the audits.
Second, we show that dynamic effects fall to zero slower for more stable income sources. Pension
income, which is highly autocorrelated (‘stable’) in the absence of audit, responds permanently. At
the other extreme, the effect on self-employment and dividend income returns to zero within three
years. This is important for two reasons. First, it has implications for the targeting of audits.
Going after a smaller suspected discrepency on a more stable income source can have high returns,
once dynamic effects are included. Reauditing is also more likely to produce additional yield for
individuals with less stable income sources. Second, it is relevant for understanding why people
respond to audits, as we describe below. A natural concern in treating this difference causally,
and using it to interpret behaviour, is that individuals with different types of income may respond
differently. To account for this we also use pairwise comparisons of income sources within individuals
who have both sources, and demonstrate that the less stable source still declines more quickly.
Third, we show that audits only change the behaviour of those who are found to have misreported.
To do this we use an event study approach. We compare individuals who were audited at some point
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in our sample and who ultimately all had the same audit outcome, for example were found to be
non-compliant. Allowing for individual and calendar time fixed effects, the comparison is essentially
between those whose non-compliance has already been uncovered by a random audit and those who
will have it uncovered in the future. We find that being audited only changes the behaviour of
those who are found to have misreported, and this is true whether or not they received a penalty.
Importantly, this tells us that the effect of audits comes not merely from scaring all taxpayers into
paying more, but specifically from those who were previously misreporting. It also allows us to rule
out audits reducing tax reports, even for those who were found compliant, in contrast with results
using alternative identification strategies (Gemmell and Ratto, 2012; Beer et al., 2019).
These results are consistent with audits providing the tax authority with information at a point
in time, which constrains future misreporting. To see this we extend the canonical model of tax
evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1987; Kleven et al., 2011), to incorporate (simple)
dynamics in the response to audit. This allows us to study the distinct predictions of three different
mechanisms that might drive changes in reporting: (1) changes in beliefs about the underlying audit
rate or penalty for evasion (‘belief updating’); (2) changes in the perceived reaudit risk following
audit (‘reaudit risk’); and (3) updates to the information held by the tax authority (‘information’).
Kleven et al. (2011) note that their observed increase in reported tax one year after audit could
be explained by some combination of beliefs and reaudit risk, but they cannot disentangle the two.
We note that a response to belief updating should be permanent, as taxpayers revise the expected
cost of non-compliance (up or down). This is inconsistent with the declining pattern of dynamic
effects we see. A response to reaudit risk would decline over time. Whether it took the form of a
‘bomb crater’ (Mittone, 2006) – that the probability of audit is lower in the years post audit before
rising back to baseline – or a worry of higher levels of short term scrutiny, we should see the same
effect across all income sources. We see a positive dynamic effect, ruling out ‘bomb craters’, and
see a differential decline across income sources, even within individual, ruling out an effect driven
purely by reaudit risk. Instead we propose a third, novel, possibility. As Kleven et al. (2011) note,
when taxpayers know the tax authority has access to third party information about some income
source, they are much less likely to underreport. Similarly, when the tax authority performs an
audit, it gets a snapshot of income at a point in time. Implausibly large deviations in reported
income in following years are likely to trigger an audit, since tax authorities (partly) condition audit
selection on differences between reported income and their expectation of that income based on other
sources of information (Advani, forthcoming). As time passes, the snapshot becomes less informative
about what current income is likely to be. This is particularly true for less stable income sources.
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In this case we should see a decline in dynamic effects over time, with less stable income sources
showing a faster decline. We should also only see responses from individuals who were found to have
misreported, since no new information about the other taxpayers is revealed to the authority. These
are precisely the patterns that are observed.
Our results imply that audits themselves are important, beyond the ‘fear’ or ‘threat’ of audit.
Much of the recent literature studying the administration of taxes and the policies that can improve
taxpayer compliance has focused on ‘letter experiments’: how different forms and content of informa-
tion provided to taxpayers can change their behaviour (see Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al.,
2001, for early work, and Mascagni, 2018; Alm, 2019; Pomeranz and Vila-Belda, 2019; Slemrod, 2019
for recent surveys of this literature). These all aim to change the perceived probability of audit.
They have the benefit that they are a very low cost policy for a tax authority, yet show substantial
(short term) gains. For example, Bergolo et al. (2020) find, in the context of VAT in Uruguay, that
firms do not respond to the actual probability of audit when sent letters informing them of this. In-
stead firms increase compliance because thinking about the audit scares them into compliance. This
raises a question: can high levels of compliance be achieved while reducing the number of audits, by
directing more resources towards information campaigns? Our results imply that this is harder than
previously thought, as much of the gain from audit is the change in behaviour it promotes. This
response is driven by the information received by the authority through actually conducting the
audit. Threat letters do not provide this information benefit. To understand any substitutability
with audits, more information is needed on the long-term effects of such letters: for how long do
threats raise compliance, and can repeated threats continue to maintain high compliance rates?
In contrast, third party information is a more direct substitute for audits. Recent work has shown
the importance (and limits) of third party information for improving compliance (Kleven et al., 2011;
Pomeranz, 2015; Kleven et al., 2016; Carrillo et al., 2017; Slemrod et al., 2017; Naritomi, 2019).
Since this directly reduces the information asymmetry between taxpayer and authority, it will also
reduce the information value of audits, which drives the dynamic effects. Conversely, for income
sources where third party information can be hard to come by, audits can be a partial alternative to
gathering information from other sources. Not only will they improve contemporaneous compliance,
but also reduce the scope for future non-compliance. This contrasts with work on firms which finds
complementarity between monitoring and enforcement (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018).
We find no evidence of ‘backfire’ effects, where audits reduce compliance. Worries about backfire
effects are common across areas of tax policy (Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2018). In our context
they raise the risk that poorly targeted audits may reduce compliance. Gemmell and Ratto (2012)
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suggest some reduction in tax reported by individuals who are audited and found compliant, rel-
ative to individuals not audited. Similar results are found in the US by Beer et al. (2019), using
a matched difference-in-difference approach. Our event study strategy allows for potential differ-
ences in unobservable characteristics between compliant and non-compliant individuals, and finds no
backfire. The difference in our results, compared to existing work, also suggests that unobservable
differences are important in explaining compliance behaviour. Since we find no reduction in overall
tax paid, it also suggests that lab experimental evidence of bomb crater effects is not reflected in
real-world settings (Maciejovsky et al., 2007; Kastlunger et al., 2009), although we note that not all
lab experiments find evidence of such effects (Choo et al., 2013).
Finally, we provide a new theoretical mechanism for why audits have the observed effects. Un-
derstanding what motivates compliance is a key question for public policy, and there are rich debates
on the extent to which moral versus economic calculations drive behaviour (Alm, 2019). We focus
on the narrower question of why audits affect compliance, and find information is the key. To do
this we use evidence from random audits, both to look at the time path of dynamic effects across
income sources and the effects by audit outcome. Though earlier work has (separately) studied both
of these issues, we show how they can be used to understand why audits change behaviour.1 Our
results complement those of Bergolo et al. (2020) and Lichand et al. (2019) who find threat of audit
works through a fear and belief-updating respectively. In contrast receipt of audit works through a
change in ability to misreport without being caught, an effect that cannot occur in the absence of
actual audit.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the policy context and data
sources. Section 3 provides evidence on who is non-compliant. Section 4 shows how audits affect
reporting behaviour in overall tax, and by different income sources. Section 5 uses an alternative
identification strategy to estimate the impact by audit outcome. Section 6 outlines a model of tax
evasion with dynamics in the response to audits, to show which mechanisms might rationalised the
observed behaviour. Section 7 concludes.
1A number of studies consider dynamic effects for one or two years after audit (Long and Schwartz, 1987; Erard,
1992; Tauchen et al., 1993; Kleven et al., 2011; Løyland et al., 2019). Concurrently with this study, DeBacker et al.
(2018) have a longer (six year) horizon, and also consider income stability, albeit with US audits where taxpayers are
explicitly told they are random, which Slemrod (2019) notes ‘would likely trigger different revaluations of how likely
a future audit is, and therefore trigger different behavioural changes’ (a similar point is made in Kleven et al., 2011).
Effects by audit outcome are studied by Gemmell and Ratto (2012) and Beer et al. (2019).
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2 Context and Data
2.1 The UK self assessment tax collection and enforcement system
In this paper, we focus on individuals who file an income tax self assessment return in the UK. Over
our sample period (1999-2012) this comprised around 9 million individuals, one-third of all individual
income taxpayers in the UK.2 Income tax is the largest of all UK taxes, consistently contributing
a quarter of total government receipts over this period. Most sources of income are subject to
income tax, including earnings, retirement pensions, income from property, interest on deposits in
bank accounts, dividends, and some welfare benefits. Income tax is levied on an individual basis and
operates through a system of allowances and bands. Each individual has a personal allowance, which
is deducted from total income. The remainder – taxable income – is then subject to a progressive
schedule of tax rates. Table 1 shows the share of individuals in our sample reporting non-zero values
for each component of income. When we later study income components separately, we focus on
those components where at least five per cent of the population report non-zero values.
Since incomes covered by self assessment tend to be harder to verify, there is a significant risk of
non-compliance. As a result, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC, the UK tax authority) carries out
audits each year to deter non-compliance and recover lost revenue. HMRC runs two types of audit,
‘targeted’ (also called ‘operational’) and ‘random’. Targeted audits are based on perceived risks of
non-compliance. Random audits are unconditionally random from the population, and are used to
ensure that all self assessment taxpayers face a positive probability of being audited, as well as to
collect statistical information about the scale of non-compliance and predictors of non-compliance
that can be used to implement targeting.
The timeline for the audit process is as follows. The tax year runs from 6th April to 5th April.
Shortly after the end of the tax year, HMRC issues a ‘notice to file’ to taxpayers who they believe
need to submit a tax return. This is based on information that HMRC held shortly before the end of
the tax year. Random audit cases are provisionally selected from the population of individuals issued
with a notice to file. The deadline by which taxpayers must submit their tax return is 31 January
the following calendar year (e.g. 31 January 2008 for the 2006/07 tax year). Once returns have
been submitted, HMRC deselects some random audit cases (e.g. due to severe illness or death of the
taxpayer). At the same time, targeted audits are selected on the basis of the information provided
2Filers include self-employed individuals, those with incomes over £100,000 (lower at the start of the sample
period), company directors, landlords, and many pensioners. The remainder have all their income tax collected
directly via withholding, so are not required to file. Note that UK tax years run across calendar years—we denote
tax years using the later year.
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in self assessment returns and other intelligence. Random audits are selected before targeted audits,
and individuals cannot be selected for a targeted audit in the same tax year as a random audit. The
list of taxpayers to be audited is passed on to local compliance teams who carry out the audits. Up
to and including 2006/07, audits had to be opened within a year of the 31 January filing deadline,
or a year from the actual date of filing for returns filed late. For tax returns relating to 2007/08 or
later, audits had to be opened within a year of the date when the return was filed. Taxpayers subject
to an audit are informed when it is opened, but they are not told whether it is a random or targeted
audit, in contrast to work done with US random audits (Long and Schwartz, 1987; DeBacker et al.,
2018). Even after audit, taxpayers are limited in what they can learn about the audit process, since
no details of the programme are made public.3 Approximately one third of taxpayers on the list
passed on to local compliance teams end up not being audited, largely due to resource constraints.4
Those who are audited initially receive a letter requesting information to verify what they have
reported. If this does not provide all the required information, the taxpayer receives a follow-up
phonecall, and ultimately in-person visits until the auditor is satisfied.
Where errors are uncovered, individuals are required to pay the additional tax due, and interest.
If non-compliance is deemed to be deliberate, the taxpayer might also face an additional penalty of
up to 100% the value of the underpaid tax.
2.2 Data sources
We exploit data on income tax self assessment random audits together with information on income
tax returns. This combines a number of different HMRC datasets, linked together on the basis of
encrypted taxpayer reference number and tax year.
Audit records for tax years 1998/99 to 2008/09 come from CQI (Compliance Quality Initiative),
an operational database that records audits of income tax self assessment returns. It includes
operational information about the audits, such as start and end dates, and audit outcomes: whether
non-compliance was found, and the size of any correction, penalties and interest.
We track individuals before and after the audit using information from tax returns for the years
1998/99 to 2011/12. This comes from two datasets: SA302 and Valid View. The SA302 dataset
contains information that is sent out to taxpayers summarising their income and tax liability (the
SA302 tax calculation form). It is derived from self assessment returns, which have been put through
a tax calculation process. It contains information about total income and tax liability as well as a
3Until the publication of this study, even the audit rates were not public information.
4We address the implications for identification in Subsection 4.1.
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breakdown into different income sources: employment earnings, self employment profits, pensions,
and so on. For all of these variables, we uprate to 2012 using the Consumer Prices Index (CPI)
to account for inflation, and trim the top 1 per cent to avoid outliers having an undue impact
on the results.5 We supplement these variables with information from Valid View, which provides
demographics and filing information (e.g. filing date). Note that we cannot identify actual compliance
behaviour after the audit: the number of random audit taxpayers that are re-audited is far too small
for it to be possible to focus just on them.
An explicit control group of ‘held out’ individuals was not constructed at the time of selection
for audit. We therefore draw control individuals from the pool of individuals who actually filed a tax
return (i.e. those who appear in SA302). This creates some differences in the filing history between
those selected for audit and those who we deem as controls. In a given year, first time filers may be
issued a notice to file after selection for audit has taken place. They may also end up back-filing one
or two returns. Since we cannot directly observe the first year in which a notice to file was issued, in
our empirical strategy it is necessary for us to control for the length of time each taxpayer has been
in self assessment. More details – including tests to demonstrate this ensures samples are balanced
– are given in Subsection 4.1 below.
3 Tax Evasion in the UK
In this section we first provide some descriptives on the probability and timeline of audits. We then
show that there is significant non-compliance among individual self assessment taxpayers, both in
the share of taxpayers who are found non-compliant and the share of tax that is misreported. More
than one third of self assessment taxpayers are found to be non-compliant, equal to 12 per cent of
all income taxpayers.
3.1 Audit descriptives
Figure 1 shows the share of individuals per year who face an income tax random audit over the
period 1998/99 to 2008/09. On average over the period the probabilities of being audited are 0.04
per cent (four in 10,000) for random audits and 2.8 per cent for targeted audits.
Table A1 provides some summary statistics for lags in, and durations of, the audit process among
random audit cases. As described above, up to and including the 2006/07 return, HMRC had to
begin an audit within 12 months of the 31 January filing deadline; since then, HMRC has had to
5In Appendix C.2 we show our results are robust to alternative levels of trimming.
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begin an audit within 12 months of the filing date. The average lag between when the tax return
was filed and when the random audit was started is 8.9 months, but 10 per cent have a lag of
14 months or more. The average duration of audits is 5.3 months, but 10 per cent experience a
duration of 13 months or more. Taken together, this means that the average time between when
a return is filed and when the audit is concluded is 14.3 months but there is a long tail for whom
the experience is much more drawn out: for almost 10 per cent it is two years or more. This means
that individuals will generally have filed at least one subsequent tax return before the outcome of
the audit is clear and some will have filed two tax returns. This will be relevant for interpreting the
results in Section 4.
3.2 Evidence of non-compliance
We begin by studying the direct results of random audits, using data on 34,630 completed random
audits of individual self assesssment taxpayers from 1998/99 to 2008/09.6 Table 2 summarises the
outcomes of these random audits. More than half of all returns are found to be correct, and 11 per
cent are found to be incorrect but with no underpayment of tax, but 36 per cent are ‘non-compliant’
i.e. incorrect and have a tax underpayment.7 Whilst this is a much higher rate of non-compliance
than has been found in other developed country contexts, it should be noted that the self assesssment
tax population is a selected subset of all taxpayers. In particular, it covers those for whom simple
withholding of income at source is not sufficient to collect the correct tax. This may be either
because some income cannot be withheld e.g. property or self-employed income, or because PAYE
struggles to assign the correct withholding codes as for people with multiple sources of pension
income. Despite this, since self assesssment taxpayers make up a third of all UK taxpayers, this
implies an overall non-compliance rate of 8 to 12 per cent among all taxpayers.8
Turning to the intensive margin, the average additional tax owed among the non-compliant is
£2,314, or 32 per cent of average liabilities. Since just over a third of random audits find evidence
of non-compliance, the average additional tax owed from an audit is then £826.9 However, the
distribution is heavily skewed: 60 per cent of non-compliant individuals owe additional tax of £1,000
653,400 cases were selected for audit over the period, of which 35,630 were implemented.
7Incorrect with no underpayment includes those who, for example, owed no taxes since they had legitimate losses,
but who had overstated those losses so would owe less in future years. Anecdotally, it also includes some cases where
actual overpayments of tax were made, although we cannot separately identify which.
8This is a lower bound, since it assumes everyone who should be in self assessment does register, all non-compliance
is picked up at audit, and those who do not need to register are also fully compliant. The range from 8 to 12 per
cent depends on the assumptions made about the implementation of audits. If among those selected for audit,
implementation of audit were random, this would imply a 12 per cent non-compliance rate. On the other hand, if
there is perfect compliance among those for whom audits were not implemented, this would imply an 8 per cent rate.
9This is the additional tax owed. A further £101 is owed, on average, in penalties. This is highly concentrated,
with less than 7% of those audited owing any penalty amount.
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or less, whilst four per cent owe more than £10,000. In terms of total revenue, those owing £1,000 or
less make up only 9 per cent of the under-reported revenue; the four per cent owing more than £10,000
collectively owe more than 42 per cent of the revenue. Equity concerns around non-compliance are
well-known: it is seen as unfair that some are not ‘paying their fair share’. But this variation in non-
compliance is also important for economic efficiency. Non-compliant individuals previously acted as
though there was a lower tax rate. This makes their activities seem relatively more productive than
those of compliant individuals, so can lead to resource misallocation.
4 Dynamic Impacts of Audits
In this section we establish two main results. First, we show that audits lead to an increase in
reported incomes and taxes in subsequent years. Looking at total income and total tax this increase
lasts five to eight years after the tax year for which the audit was done. Second, we show variation in
this impact by income source. In particular, more autocorrelated income sources (such as pensions)
seem to respond permanently to audit. In contrast, income sources which are less autocorrelated,
such as self-employment income, more quickly return to baseline. This second result will later help
explain why we see these dynamic responses. Before describing these results in detail, we first discuss
the empirical approach taken. Briefly, we compare individuals selected for random audit with those
not selected but who could have been selected. We control for filing history, to account for the way
the sample was selected.
4.1 Estimation
To understand how audits affect future tax receipts we want to estimate the change in tax paid in
the years after audit that is caused by the audit. To recover this we make use of the ‘random audits
programme’ run by the tax authority (HMRC). This programme selects for audit a random sample
of taxpayers from the pool of taxpayers known to be required to file for a given tax year. One can
therefore compare those selected for audit with others who were not selected but who could have
been.
In each audited tax year we select a sample of individuals who were not audited and could have
been. We assign them a “placebo audit” for that tax year. We can then compare them over time
to individuals actually selected for audit for that year. Our sample therefore consists of individuals
who were selected for random audit in some year between 1999 and 2009, and individuals who could
have been selected in those same years but were not. Our data on tax returns goes up to 2012.
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For every individual selected for audit in a given tax year, we draw six control individuals from the
population of those who could have been audited in the same tax year.10
In practice a little more than two-thirds of those selected for random audit are actually audited.
This is explained by the high workload faced by the compliance teams implementing audits. Ad-
ditionally, a small fraction of the control group (around two per cent) is also audited. Random
audits are selected before targeted audits, and no explicit control group was constructed to ‘hold
out’ some individuals from targeting. To our knowledge, in prior work only (Kleven et al., 2011)
have an explicit control group. This explains why they can only study a single year after audit –
tax authorities are unwilling to hold off on high value audits for multiple years. Hence we compare
those selected for a random audit to a ‘business as usual’ group, rather than a pure control group.
This will tend to reduce the estimated impacts, since individuals in the control group who are most
likely to be non-compliant are audited.
In the empirical work to follow, we focus on the local average treatment effect (LATE), instru-
menting receipt of audit with selection for random audit. This is the relevant number for a tax
authority thinking about simultaneously expanding the size of the random audit programme and
the number of auditors. It gives the average impact h years after audit for an additional random
audit case that might be worked, against which the cost of the audit would be compared.
One limitation of our data is a slight mismatch between our treated and control samples in
terms of their probability of filing in previous years, for reasons relating to the audit timeline and
when they were first issued a notice to file, as described in Subsection 2.2. This can be seen in
Table A3 which documents (unconditional) sample balance between five and one years before audit,
for income and tax totals, income components, and individual characteristics. Overall balancing
statistics suggest that the samples are fairly well balanced: the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test of
the joint insignificance of all the regressors is 0.181, while the mean and median absolute standardised
percentage bias across all outcomes of interest are low at 2.4 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively.11
However, the likelihood of being in the sample in previous years (‘survival’) differs between our
treatment and control groups. This difference is consistent with how the treatment and control
10In principle the entire population of taxpayers who could have been audited could have been used. However,
since the data could be accessed only in a secure facility at the tax office, computational constraints given the available
hardware limited the sample size that could be used.
11The standardised percentage bias is the difference in the sample means between treated and control groups as a
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups (see Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1985). Rubin’s B and R statistics are also well within reasonable thresholds to consider the samples to be
balanced, at 10.8 and 0.983 respectively. Rubin’s B is the absolute standardised difference of the means of the linear
index of the propensity score in the treated and control group. Rubin’s R is the ratio of treated to control variances
of the propensity score index. Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for
the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced.
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groups were selected, so might reflect real differences in the samples. We therefore include controls
for presence in the data in the years before audit.12 Table 3 shows that once we condition on past
survival the sample is balanced.
We therefore estimate the following specification:
Yihs =
8∑
h=−5
αhηh +
8∑
h=−5
βhηhDi +
2012∑
s=1999
γsTs +
−1∑
s=−4
δsSis + εihs (1)
where Yihs is the outcome for individual i, h years after the tax year selected for audit (with control
observations having h = 0 for the tax year for which they were drawn as controls), when current
calendar year is s ≡ t+h. ηh are indicators for being h years after the tax year selected for audit; Di
is an indicator for whether the individual is actually audited; Ts is a calendar time indicator for tax
year s; and {Si,−1, . . . , Si,−4} are indicators for whether the individual was in the data in each of the
four years before audit. The error term, εihs, is clustered at the individual level. Audit status, Di,
is instrumented by (random) selection for audit, Zi. The coefficients of interest are βh ∀h. These
estimate the impact of the audit on the outcome variable h years after the tax year selected for
audit, measured as the difference in the mean outcome for those actually audited and those who
would have been audited only if selected for a random audit.
4.2 Overall impact of audits
Beyond the direct effects of the audit, described in Section 2, we also see clear evidence of dynamic
effects. Comparing individuals who were randomly selected for audit with individuals who could
have been (but were not) selected, those selected for audit on average report higher levels of tax
owed in the years after audit. Figure 2 shows the estimated impact on those who were actually
audited (i.e. the LATE). The difference in the share audited between the treated and control group
is around 66 percentage points, so the LATE is around 1.5 times the intention to treat estimate.
The impact of an audit peaks two years after the tax year for which the audit is conducted.
This is consistent with the fact that many audits are not started until after the following year’s tax
return has already been submitted.13 Reported tax among audited taxpayers is significantly greater
12In Appendix C.1 we show the results taking a different approach, where we instead use stratified random sampling
conditioning the stratification on filing history. Point estimates are similar, and never statistically significantly different
from our main approach, although they decline more rapidly from year 4.
13In our sample, almost a quarter of audits are not opened for more than 12 months from the date of filing (see
Table A1). Additionally, there can be some lag between the tax authority ‘taking up’ a case for audit and notification
being received by the taxpayer. If taxpayers each consistently file at the same time every year, this implies at least
one quarter would have filed without knowledge of the audit. More than half will have filed without knowing the
result of the audit (Table A1). One could instead set h = 0 as the time at which audit begins, but this information
13
than among non-audited taxpayers for five years after the audit, and the point estimate appears
to decline relatively smoothly, getting close to zero by the eighth tax year after the audited year.
This pattern of effects is robust to changes in the level of trimming, although when lower levels of
trimming are used standard errors are larger and consequently some significance levels are lower (see
Appendix C.2 for details).
From Figure 2 we can estimate how much revenue audits raise on average by changing the
behaviour of audited individuals. Over the five (eight) years after the audited year, the dynamic
effects bring in an additional £1230 (£1530), 1.5 (1.8) times the direct effect of audit. Although
taxpayers in the US are explicitly told that the random audits are random, DeBacker et al. (2018)
find a similar ratio between direct and indirect effects of audit. Ex ante one might have expected
smaller behavioural effects, since taxpayers are aware that the authority is not acting based on any
suspicion of wrongdoing. Our exploration of the mechanism driving these dynamics will explain why,
ex post, these effects should be so similar: the dynamics are driven by constraints to misreporting
caused by audit, rather than belief-updating or perceived reaudit risk which may both respond to
the reasoning behind the audit.
These dynamic effects highlight the policy importance of studying the long term impact of
audits: when determining the audit strategy, the revenue raising effects of audits would be grossly
understated without considering the impact on future behaviour. This would imply too few audits
taking place.
It is important to note that the optimal number of audits will in general not equate the marginal
return on audit to the marginal cost of an audit. Audits require real resource costs, while the direct
benefits are a transfer of resources from citizens to the state (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) for a
longer discussion of this point). There are likely also indirect benefits in terms of maintaining overall
compliance, as well as potentially intrinsic value placed in upholding the rule of law (Cowell, 1990).
Additionally, the social cost of audit must incorporate not only the cost to the tax authority, but
also the cost to the taxpayer for which accurate figures are difficult to come by (Burgherr, 2020).
We therefore do not attempt a full welfare analysis. Instead we merely note that dynamic effects
increase the resources that are transfered to the state without increasing the administrative costs
of audit. Assuming that a positive weight is placed on such transfers, taking into account dynamic
effects increases the number of audits that should be undertaken.
is not available for controls, so risks creating bias if the timing of opening audits among individuals selected for audit
is non-random.
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Figure 3 shows that a very similar pattern holds for the impact on total income reported. Again
there is a clear dynamic effect, peaking two years after the audited year and declining to zero by year
eight, though not significantly different from zero by year five. This provides additional support to
the previous result for tax, and is not purely by construction, since expenses can often be used to
offset income to reduce tax (Carrillo et al., 2017; Slemrod et al., 2017).
4.3 Impact by income source
We repeat the previous estimation separately for different income sources, focusing on income sources
for which at least five per cent of the sample report non-zero amounts.14 This will be one way in
which we discriminate between different possible explanations for why we see dynamic effects.
Figure 4 shows how the impact of an audit changes over time for the different components of
income. Since the magnitudes of these incomes are different, for comparability we rescale them
relative to the peak impact for that income source.
We see that, relative to the peak, self-employment income and dividends decline relatively quickly.
Three years later point estimates for these are close to zero i.e. reporting is not different to the
control group. In contrast, pension income exhibits little decline. Six years later it retains 80%
of the impact, and this not statistically different from 100%. This pattern is suggestive of the
importance of autocorrelation: income sources which one would expect to be more correlated over
time appear to show weaker declines.
Table 4 shows the autocorrelation for each income source. Pension income is highly autocorre-
lated, since it will typically be an annuity and therefore fixed over time; property income is slightly
less stable, since rents may vary more; and at the other extreme self-employment and dividend in-
come are considerably less stable. The relative autocorrelations of income sources line up exactly
with their speeds of decline.15
There are two caveats to these results. The first is that these measures are noisy, so if confidence
intervals were added to Figure 4 for each income source, many would overlap. The second is that
individuals with different income sources may have different propensities for non-compliance.
To tackle these concerns, we next use two alternative strategies. First, we compare within indi-
viduals who have multiple income sources. This immediately solves the second problem above, since
14We exclude interest income, since it is both very small and not everyone needs to report this, making it hard to
compare. See Table 1 for information on the share of individuals with each income source.
15Note that a comparison of pensions versus property income is helpful in distinguishing this effect of autocorrelation
compared with the effect of third party information. Both have a high autocorrelation, but pensions was third party
reported while property income was not. In Figure 4 we see essentially the same effect for both sources, despite the
large difference in third party information. Conversely, comparing property income and dividend income – which like
property is also not third party reported but has a low autocorrelation – we see very different effects.
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our results will be within individual. It will also lead to ten pairwise comparisons: every unordered
pair of the five income sources studied. For each pair, our sample is composed of individuals who had
both sources sometime in the three years before audit. We then study the relative fall in reporting
of each of these income sources four years after the peak. In each case we expect to find the less
autocorrelated source falls fastest.
We find this result in eight out of ten cases. If there were no relationship, we should find this to
be true in around five of the tests. The probability of this result under the null of no relationship is
5.5%, close to standard significance thresholds. Hence more autocorrelated income sources do seem
to decline slower than less autocorrelated ones.
Our second strategy to tackle concern about heterogeneity in who receives different income
sources is to reweight individuals based on individual characteristics.16 This ensures the distribution
of observed characteristics is the same across recipients of different incomes. We divide individuals
into groups by sex, age band (below 40, 40-65, and above 65—the UK state pension age at which
people typically retire), and quartiles of filing history. We then run weighted regressions so that the
weighted samples match closely the distribution of these characteristics seen among individuals with
self-employment income. We then replicate Figure 4 using the results of the reweighted regression,
shown as Figure A2. The results look very similar – the only noticeable effects are that property
income appears to decline slightly faster than previously, and dividend income much more quickly.
Our interpretation for this result, which we formalise below, is that audits provide the tax
authority with information. Where errors are uncovered, taxpayers file amended returns. Although
we do not know, and would not be allowed to reveal, precisely how audit targeting is done, it is clear
that ‘surprising’ deviations from recorded historic reports are part of this. The amended return is
therefore creating a new benchmark against which future returns will be compared. Hence, income
from highly autocorrelated sources will – once uncovered – be hard to hide again, as deviations
from the truth will be easily noticed. In contrast, declines in less autocorrelated income sources
are less informative to the authority because they might well be real for an individual taxpayer.
Viewed in aggregate, falls and rises should be equally likely, since the control group will account for
any trends in the income source. Hence when we observe a decline in aggregate income reports for
e.g. dividend income among audited taxpayers, this can be attributed to non-compliance, although
we cannot identify which individuals are the ones under-reporting. Since declines are faster for
less autocorrelated income sources, this suggests the importance of information provision. This is
something we know from other settings to be important (Kleven et al., 2011; Pomeranz, 2015),
16We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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although the value of audits as a potential source of information about future tax has not previously
been recognised.
One caveat to this interpretation is that falls in reporting could alternatively be driven by changes
in actual income. For example, those who are audited might sell shares to pay fines, reducing
dividend income. Whilst this is possible, it seems unlikely. In cash terms, the peak additional
income reported for those who have dividend income is £414. Assuming a high end estimate for
the dividend yield of 10%, implies £4140 of undeclared shares. Conservatively assuming also that
individuals are on the higher rate of income tax, this implies an additional £135 of tax owed. The
absolute maximum penalty for misreporting is 100% of the tax due (on top of paying the tax).
So selling all these shares (and hence looking like the control group) would be needed only for an
individual who is found to have misreported for at least fifteen years, and receives the maximum
fine. While such cases might exist, it seems extreme to assume that this is occuring at the average.
Hence we think it is unlikely that the observed pattern represents changes in real behaviour, rather
than reporting, though we cannot definitively rule it out.
5 Impacts by Audit Outcome
We next consider how dynamic effects vary depending on the outcome of audit. This is important
for policy, as it helps distinguish whether merely the process of being audited is enough to impact
reported income and tax. We find that those who were found to be correct do not respond, while
those for whom errors were found increase reported tax. Being audited per se does not appear to
increase reported tax – i.e. there is no change in behaviour among compliant taxpayers – but those
found to have underpaid are 18pp more likely to report higher tax owed after audit. We first describe
the approach taken to study this question, since our previous control group cannot help us study
effects by audit outcome. We then describe the findings highlighted above.
5.1 Empirical approach
Since we now wish to study audit impacts separately by audit outcome, we cannot use the earlier
identification strategy. In the “placebo audit” group we cannot observe what audit outcomes would
have been, so cannot construct separate control groups for each audit outcome. Gemmell and Ratto
(2012) study this question by comparing each treatment group to the original control group contain-
ing people with a mix of possible outcomes, implicitly assuming that audit outcomes are exogenously
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assigned. More recently Beer et al. (2019) use a matched difference-in-difference approach, allowing
for observable differences in audit outcome.
We take an ‘event study’ approach to answer this question. Our sample for each regression is
the set of observations who are audited and found to have some particular outcome, e.g. found
to be compliant. Within that sample, the timing of audit is random – there is nothing systematic
that led individuals to be selected in a particular year within the sample. Hence we can compare
the outcome for someone audited and found to have a particular status (e.g. to be compliant) with
someone who will be audited and found to have the same status.
For our variable of interest we now focus on a binary variable measuring whether tax paid
increases, rather than on the sizes of increase, as in Pomeranz (2015). In particular, we estimate a
linear probability model where the outcome is whether tax paid in year t is larger than in the year
before audit. Our interest now is understanding which individuals – when split by audit status –
respond. This outcome is therefore preferred, since it compares individuals to their own history, and
is equally responsive to increases for individuals across the distribution of taxes owed. It is also less
sensitive to relatively extreme observations, which is more important in our event study approach
because the sample size is now much smaller. Whereas previously we had a treatment group of
53,000 individuals, and could draw a large sample of controls from the non-audit population, now
the entire sample is those selected for audit. That sample is then further split into subsamples by
audit outcome status, making results more sensitive to outliers and reducing power. Use of a binary
variable removes this sensitivity, without limiting our ability to study which groups respond.
In our specification we control for a number of key covariates: sex, age, industry, region and years
filing, as well as calendar year fixed effects. Many of these individual characteristics have been shown
to be predictive of non-compliance (Advani, forthcoming), so if responsiveness to audit also differs
by these characteristics then without such controls we may partly pick up purely a compositional
effect.
5.2 Results by audit outcome
To assess the reasonableness of the approach, we again begin by studying the estimated impact in
the years before audit. The first four rows of Table 5 provides the results for the pre-audit period.
It can be seen that all the point estimates are close to zero, providing support for the validity of
this approach. A second test of validity can be seen from the ‘Not audited’ column. This estimates
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the effect of being selected for audit on individuals who were never actually audited, nor informed
that they had been selected. As expected, again the point estimates are very close to zero.
Turning to the columns, three results can be seen. First, those who were audited and found to
have made no errors also do not respond. This is important because it tells us that the dynamic
response isn’t driven by the mere fact of audit. Direct audit effects could happen, for example, if the
process of audit were sufficiently unpleasant that taxpayers decided to err upwards when uncertain,
in the hope of avoiding further audits. One could also potentially have seen negative direct effects
in this group. If some taxpayers were incorrectly found to be compliant, they may learn that the
tax authority is less effective at detecting non-compliance than they previously believed, and reduce
payments. We find neither of these results: on average those whose returns are found correct do
not change their reports. This is in contrast to work by Gemmell and Ratto (2012) and Beer et al.
(2019).
Second, those who are found to have errors are more likely to report higher levels of tax in
subsequent years. Even four years later they are 13-14pp more likely to report higher tax owed.
Hence the long-term effects observed appear to all come from correcting errors made by the taxpayer.
Note that even those who made errors but owed no additional tax respond to the audit. This is
because the errors made might affect future tax liability. For example, claiming excessively large
expenses today might increase the size of a loss on property income that can be carried forward:
correcting this increases future tax liabilities. Anecdotally, from speaking to audit officers, in some
cases these individuals shift their reports to pay tax in the audit year so that they can smooth out
the additional tax liability that they will now face over the coming years.
Third, those who receive a penalty appear to have been driving some of the shape of the dynamics
we observed earlier, where we saw a peak two years after the year selected for audit. Whilst those
with mistakes but no penalty respond immediately, the response for those with a penalty peaks two
years after the year for which the audit is done. This reflects two features of the audit process.
Firstly, those who ultimately receive penalties typically take longest to audit, since their under-
reporting requires more work to detect. The audit settlement date is thus later. If some taxpayers
wait until the audit (and uncertainty about detection) is resolved to respond, this will delay the
time until they are observed to respond. Second, taxpayers with mistakes but no penalties will have
their original return corrected, so an immediate response is observed. On the other hand, those who
receive a penalty may not have their return corrected: in most cases they instead file a separate
form detailing additional tax, interest, and penalties.
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We note that among individual characteristics, the only one which predicts responsiveness over-
all is sex: women are around 3pp more likely to respond to an audit. This is purely driven by
compositional effects. Looking by audit outcome there are no differences in responsiveness by sex.
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6 Simple Model of Tax Evasion and Audit Response
To help understand the mechanism underlying the observed results, we consider an extended version
of the model of rational tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which is based on the Becker
(1968) model of crime. In the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, individuals receive income and
choose how much to report to the authority. Under-reporting has the benefit that individuals end
up paying less tax, but the cost that they may be caught and receive a punishment on top of paying
the correct tax. The probability of being caught is increasing in the amount of evasion. Kleven et al.
(2011) extend this to allow some income to be third-party reported: under-reporting this income is
detected with probability 1 so individuals will only evade out of non-third party reported income.
The key innovation of our model is to split non-third party reported income into more versus less
stable sources.17 Incomes from some sources, such as pension annuity income, are very autocorrelated
(‘stable’), while other sources, such as self-employment income for a sole trader, are much less stable.
Autocorrelation captures the extent to which information learned in an audit today is informative
about incomes tomorrow. By first extending the model of Kleven et al. (2011) to multiple time
periods, and then allowing for differential autocorrelation of income sources we are able to distinguish
different possible mechanisms for why audits are observed to have long-term effects.
Consider an individual who is audited (for the first time) in year t. Being audited may change his
reporting for some combination of the following three reasons: (1) beliefs about the underlying audit
rate or penalty for evasion (‘belief updating’); (2) changes in the perceived reaudit risk following
audit (‘reaudit risk’); and (3) updates to the information held by the tax authority (‘information’).18
In the first of these mechanisms, there is a change in beliefs about fixed parameters, either audit
rate or penalty. Consequently, any response should also be permanent, and common across all
income sources. Empirically neither of these is true.
Under the second mechanism the individual perceives a temporary change in the risk of being
audited. If he perceives the risk to have risen, he should be more compliant in the short term but
as perceived risk returns to baseline reporting should do so also. Conversely if he perceived the
risk to have fallen – the so-called ‘bomb crater effect’ (Mittone, 2006; Maciejovsky et al., 2007; and
Kastlunger et al., 2009) – then he should be temporarily less compliant. In both cases the dynamics
of this behaviour should be common across income sources. The differential responses across income
sources, even within individual, are not consistent with this mechanism.
17Full details and formalisation is provided in Appendix B.
18A formalisation of the following results is provided in Appendix B.
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The final mechanism is that audits provide information, which differentially changes the ability
to hide certain sources of income. Performing an audit provides the tax authority with more accurate
information on a taxpayer’s income at a point in time. In subsequent years, information from the
audit will make evasion of more stable income sources easier to detect, but for less stable income
sources the effect will rapidly wear off. Hence under this mechanism, the initial impact on reporting
behaviour will decline back to baseline, and this decline will be more rapid for income sources which
have a lower autocorrelation. This is consistent with our findings, as seen in Figure 4.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigated the dynamic effects of audits on income reported in subsequent tax returns.
Understanding these effects is important both from the perspective of quantifying the returns to
the tax authority from an audit, and for assessing the mechanisms by which audits might influence
taxpayer behaviour. To answer this question we exploited a random audit program run by the UK
tax authority (HMRC) under which an average of around 4,900 individuals are randomly selected for
audit each year. We used data on audits over the period 1998/99 to 2008/09 and tracked responses
on tax returns between 1998/99 and 2011/12.
We established three main results. First, we provided evidence of important dynamic effects,
with the additional tax revenue over the five years post-audit equalling 1.5 times the direct revenue
raised by audit. Second, we documented that a return to misreporting occurred more rapidly after
audit for income sources which were less autocorrelated. Third, we showed that only those who were
found to have made mistakes responded to the audit. Extending the standard model of rational
tax evasion, we demonstrated that the observed dynamics are consistent only with audits revealing
information to the tax authority, which makes misreporting certain income sources easier to detect
for a period after the audit.
Our results have three main policy implications. First, taking dynamic effects into account
substantially increases the estimated revenue impact of audits. The direct effect of an audit is (on
average) £830, whilst the cumulative dynamic effect over the subsequent five years is £1230, 1.5
times the direct effect. This suggests that the optimal audit rate should be substantially increased
relative to the situation where there are no dynamic effects. A back-of-the envelope calculation
suggests the cost of an audit to the tax authority is around £2500, so that even random audits are
close to breaking even. For targeted audits, including dynamic effects raises the average return from
around £6000 to £15000.
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Second, the variation in dynamic effects observed across different income components alters
the way in which targeted audits should be targeted: audits should focus more on individuals
reporting types of income with the largest overall effects, combining immediate and dynamic effects.
For example, the peak annual impact on reported self-employment income for each self-employed
individual is over £1000, higher than other components. This suggests focusing more on individuals
reporting self-employment income. Likewise, although the maximum annual impact on pension
income is lower, it is persistent, so there may be more incentive to target individuals believed to be
under-reporting pension income. The precise design of any targeting strategy must of course take
into account how taxpayers would respond to the strategy, but for the tax authority the first step
in designing any targeting strategy must be to know where the revenue is.
Third, there are implications for setting optimal re-auditing strategies. Impacts for reported self-
employment income and dividend income die away after about four years, so it might make sense
to revisit these individuals around this time. In contrast, the impact on reported pension income
seems to persist for at least eight years, implying that there is less need to re-audit these individuals
so soon. Again the responses of taxpayers to changes in audit strategy must be considered.
Our findings also highlight the importance of further study of the indirect effect of tax compliance
audits. One natural direction for further work would be to understand how the dynamic effects vary
in the context of targeted audits, which are focused on individuals deemed likely to be non-compliant.
A second avenue for exploration is the spillover effect of audits: does auditing taxpayers change the
behaviour of other taxpayers with whom they interact (Boning et al., 2018). A third question is the
extent to which cheaper ‘threat letters’ can be used to maintain consistently high levels of compliance
over the long term, in the absence of high audit probabilities. Better understanding these effects is
crucial in determining optimal audit policy.
Finally, our results speak to the wider use of audits for public policy, be that to reduce corruption,
improve public service delivery, or ensure environmental standards are met. A key lesson is that
audits change future behaviour, but how that behaviour changes depends on the likelihood of being
caught in the future. Unless there are ongoing incentives to improve compliance – such as increased
audit risk, increased penalties, or easier verification of misreporting – changes in reporting may be
short-lived. However, a key trade-off in public policy contexts is that individuals may be able to
substitute entirely out of audited activities, if the strictness of enforcement is too high. This limits
the compliance improvements achieved (Tulli, 2019) and may have additional welfare costs as some
valuable activities become more expensive (Gerardino et al., 2020) or do not take place (Lichand
et al., 2019).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Share of taxpayers with
each source of income
Income component Proportion
Interest .587
Employment .482
Self employment .375
Dividends .370
Pensions .300
Property .136
Foreign .048
Trusts and estates .010
Share schemes .002
Other .030
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998/99 to 2008/09. In-
cludes observations in year selected for audit or placebo audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative
datasets.
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Table 2: Random audit outcomes
Mean Std. dev.
Proportion of audited returns deemed
Correct .532 .499
Incorrect but no underpayment .111 .314
Incorrect with underpayment (non-compliant) .357 .479
Mean additional tax if non-compliant (£) 2,314 7,758
Distribution of additional tax if non-compliant
Share £1-100 .116 .320
Share £101-1,000 .483 .500
Share £1,001-10,000 .361 .480
Share £10,001+ .039 .194
Observations 34,630
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998/99 to 2008/09. Includes all individuals with a completed random audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Table 3: Sample balance, conditioning on filing history
Years after audit -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Characteristics
Female Mean .274 .276 .278 .282 .287
Difference -.005 -.006 -.005 -.006 -.005
p-value .236 .212 .292 .234 .338
Age Mean 49.2 49.3 49.3 49.4 49.5
Difference .0 .0 .1 .1 .1
p-value .472 .600 .188 .170 .110
In London or SE Mean .333 .334 .335 .333 .331
Difference -.003 .001* .003 .002 .002
p-value .159 .026 .015 .317 .190
Has tax agent Mean .628 .614 .603 .589 .573
Difference -.003 -.001 -.001 .002 .002
p-value .522 .500 .376 .675 .606
Income and tax totals
Total taxable income Mean 35,075 34,670 34,030 32,912 31,755
Difference -2 35 -163 71 56
p-value .979 .469 .012 .280 .439
Total tax Mean 9,646 9,539 9,321 8,979 8,635
Difference 14 12 -40 12 15
p-value .982 .288 .061 .261 .887
Income components
Employment Mean 22,508 22,534 22,266 21,708 21,145
Difference 11 -57 -98 112* 43*
p-value .758 .023 .152 .049 .05
Self employment Mean 6,546 6,379 6,200 5,950 5,581
Difference 56 38 -49 -18 29
p-value .298 .435 .033 .161 .684
Interest and dividends Mean 4,007 3,905 3,895 3,759 3,645
Difference -26 16 -27 7 4
p-value .667 .189 .235 .958 .086
Pensions Mean 3,493 3,542 3,561 3,562 3,531
Difference -23 -23 -3 4 22
p-value .806 .482 .681 .463 .523
Property Mean 869 844 811 769 726
Difference -5 -6 0 6 0
p-value .282 .209 .525 .072 .518
Foreign Mean 194 193 194 181 169
Difference 1 -1 5 -4 0
p-value .627 .137 .526 .117 .925
Trusts and estates Mean 150 145 145 131 123
Difference 17 -1 -6 4 3
p-value .153 .963 .204 .686 .824
Share schemes Mean 91 104 68 62 55
Difference 8* -8 -1 9 1
p-value .019 .711 .783 .683 .243
Other Mean 80 75 76 73 71
Difference 3 -3 0 1 2
p-value .618 .184 .228 .984 .194
Notes: ‘Years after audit’ measures time relative to audit, or placebo audit for controls. ‘Mean’ is the mean outcome
in the control (not selected for audit) group across all years. ‘Difference’ is the coefficient on the treatment dummy
in a regression of the outcome on a treatment dummy and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed taxes in each of
the four years before audit (or placebo audit for controls). Treatment dummy equals 1 if taxpayer was selected by
HMRC for a random audit. p-values are derived from an F-test that coefficients on interactions between treatment
and tax year dummies are all zero in a regression of the outcome of interest on tax year dummies, interactions
between treatment and tax year dummies, and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed taxes in each of the four years
before audit (or placebo audit for controls). This is a stronger test than just testing the coefficient on treatment not
interacted. Monetary values are in 2012 prices. Standard errors are clustered by taxpayer. * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Table 4: Autocorrelation by income source
Corr(t,t-1) Corr(t,t-2) Corr(t,t-3)
Pension income .946 .904 .864
Property income .896 .836 .790
Employment income .862 .769 .690
Interest income .835 .722 .640
Self-employment income .832 .728 .644
Dividend income .813 .723 .657
Sample size 4,506,548 4,506,548 4,506,548
Notes: Annual averages for years 1998/99 to 2011/12.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Table 5: Impact by audit outcome
Years since Overall Correct Mistake Mistake Pos. yield Not
audit nonpos pos + penalty audited
-5 -.006 -.042* .048 .033 -.014 -.002
(.013) (.018) (.049) (.032) (.072) (.030)
-4 .007 -.034 .068 .050 .037 -.006
(.014) (.019) (.049) (.033) (.068) (.030)
-3 .005 -.023 .058 .039 .042 -.016
(.014) (.019) (.050) (.033) (.068) (.030)
-2 .022 -.005 .079 .075* .032 -.008
(.014) (.019) (.050) (.033) (.068) (.030)
-1 Outcome is difference from -1
so zero by construction
0 .056*** .016 .131* .179*** .092 -.014
(.014) (.019) (.051) (.033) (.069) (.030)
1 .048*** .012 .109* .174*** .180** -.037
(.014) (.019) (.051) (.033) (.069) (.030)
2 .042** .007 .135** .152*** .207** -.052
(.013) (.020) (.051) (.033) (.069) (.031)
3 .030* -.007 .135** .133*** .171* -.048
(.014) (.020) (.052) (.034) (.069) (.031)
4 .031* -.0024 .134* .137*** .143* -.045
(.014) (.021) (.052) (.034) (.070) (.031)
5 .033* .019 .160** .119** .128 -.052
(.016) (.023) (.056) (.037) (.074) (.034)
N 124,223 46,911 9,519 25,666 6,983 35,144
Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy for whether tax paid is higher in each of the years before/after audit than
the year immediately before audit (‘-1’). ‘Overall’ uses the full sample of audited individuals to perform an event
study for whether tax paid is higher than in the year before audit. Coefficients from a linear probability model are
shown, with standard errors in parentheses. Other columns split the audited sample by audit outcome: tax return
found to be correct; tax return found to have a mistake but which doesn’t change tax liability (or in a small number
of cases reduced liability); tax return found to have a mistake leading to increased tax liability, but no penalty charged
(i.e. treated as legitimate error); tax return found to have under-reported liability and a penalty charged (i.e. deemed
to be deliberate); tax return selected for audit but no audit actually implemented (placebo test). * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
31
Figure 1: Change in the probability of audit over time
Notes: Constructed using data on individuals who received an audit of their self assessment tax return for a tax year
between 1998/1999 and 2008/2009, and the full sample of self assessment returns for the same period.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 2: Dynamic effect of audits on total reported tax owed
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. The
solid line plots the point estimate for the difference in average ‘total reported tax’ between individuals who were and
weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the audit. This comes from a regression of total reported tax on
dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls), dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for
controls) interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed a return
in each of the four years before audit, with audit status instrumented by selection for audit. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 3: Dynamic effect of audits on total reported income
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. The solid
line plots the point estimate for the difference in average ‘total reported income’ (income from all sources) between
individuals who were and weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the audit. This comes from a regression
of total reported income on dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls), dummies for years since
audit (or placebo audit for controls) interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and dummies for whether
the taxpayer filed a return in each of the four years before audit, with audit status instrumented by selection for audit.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 4: Relative dynamics by income source: less autocorrelated sources
of income see faster declines
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. Each
line plots the point estimate for the difference in the average of a particular component of income between individuals
who were and weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the peak impact for that income source. This
comes from a regression of each income component on dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls),
dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls) interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and
dummies for whether the taxpayer filed a return in each of the four years before audit, with audit status instrumented
by selection for audit.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
35
Appendices
Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Random audit lags and durations
Mean Std. dev. Median 75th 90th
Lag to audit start (months) 8.9 4.0 9 11 14
Audit duration (months) 5.3 6.6 3 7 13
Total time to audit end (months) 14.3 7.3 13 17 23
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998/99 to 2008/09. Includes all individuals with a
completed random audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
Table A2: Third party reporting arrangements in the UK
Income component Degree of third-party reporting
Employment Complete
Interest Complete
Pensions Partial, via pension provider
Self employment None unless an entertainer, sportsman, or contractor
in the construction industry
Dividends None
Property None
Source: Personal communication with Tracey Bowler, Tax Law Review Committee.
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Table A3: Sample balance (unconditional)
Years after audit -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Characteristics
Female Mean .274 .276 .278 .282 .287
Difference -.006 -.004 -.002 -.001 -.002
p-value .221 .359 .606 .627 .863
Age Mean 49.2 49.3 49.3 49.4 49.5
Difference .2 .3 .3 .2 .2
p-value .756 .586 .390 .610 .057
In London or SE Mean .333 .334 .335 .333 .331
Difference -.006 .001* .004* .002 .002
p-value .177 .025 .011 .281 .152
Has tax agent Mean .628 .614 .603 .589 .573
Difference .000 .002 .001 .003 .005
p-value .547 .508 .405 .396 .412
Survives Mean .624 .669 .728 .803 .892
Difference .032*** .039*** .047*** .050*** .050***
p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Income and tax totals
Total taxable income Mean 35,075 34,670 34,030 32,912 31,755
Difference 881 492 403* 1,051* 1,095*
p-value .374 .157 .028 .012 .012
Total tax Mean 9,646 9,539 9,321 8,979 8,635
Difference 260 63 82 310 337*
p-value .539 .303 .055 .064 .027
Income components
Employment Mean 22,508 22,534 22,266 21,708 21,145
Difference -31 -136 180* 909** 721*
p-value .162 .371 .028 .006 .027
Self employment Mean 6,546 6,379 6,200 5,950 5,581
Difference 356 328 173 99 200*
p-value .151 .174 .311 .106 .025
Interest and dividends Mean 4,007 3,905 3,895 3,759 3,645
Difference -36 208 18 63 112
p-value .767 .432 .700 .578 .580
Pensions Mean 3,493 3,542 3,561 3,562 3,531
Difference 176 168 128 148 159
p-value .425 .478 .642 .307 .327
Property Mean 869 844 811 769 726
Difference 18 -2 37 47 31
p-value .813 .952 .576 .498 .134
Foreign Mean 194 193 194 181 169
Difference 23 -1 -5 -6 1
p-value .759 .240 .956 .317 .766
Trusts and estates Mean 150 145 145 131 123
Difference 46 17 8 19 8
p-value .245 .367 .290 .125 .367
Share schemes Mean 91 104 68 62 55
Difference 17* 24 22** 11 -6**
p-value .043 .062 .004 .132 .008
Other Mean 80 75 76 73 71
Difference -1 -4 0 5 6
p-value .747 .675 .645 .796 .167
Notes: ‘Years after audit’ measures time relative to audit, or placebo audit for controls. ‘Mean’ is the mean outcome
in the control (not selected for audit) group across all years. ‘Difference’ is the coefficient on the treatment dummy
in a regression of the outcome on a treatment dummy. Treatment dummy equals 1 if taxpayer was selected by HMRC
for a random audit. p-values are derived from an F-test that coefficients on interactions between treatment and tax
year dummies are all zero in a regression of the outcome of interest on tax year dummies and interactions between
treatment and tax year dummies. This is a stronger test than just testing the coefficient on treatment not interacted.
Tests for all outcomes other than ‘survives’ are conditional on survives = 1. Monetary values are in 2012 prices.
Standard errors are clustered by taxpayer. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A1: Non-compliance over the prior year reported income distribu-
tion
Notes: Constructed using data on individuals who received a random audit of their self assessment tax return for
a tax year between 1998/1999 and 2008/2009. Income grouping is done based on previous year’s reported income.
16.2% of individuals report having zero income in the previous year. The remaining individuals are divided into five
equal sized bins based on their previous income: quintiles conditional on reporting non-zero income. ‘Share of group
found to be non-compliant’ is the share of individual taxpayers who are found to owe additional tax when audited.
‘Average additional revenue if non-compliant’ is the average total tax in 2012 £that was not reported among those
individuals for whom some tax was not reported (the non-compliant). ‘Additional revenue as a share of total tax if
non-compliant’ is the additional tax owed divided by total tax owed, averaged across individual taxpayers who were
non-compliant.
Source: Advani (forthcoming).
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Figure A2: Relative dynamics by income source, after reweighting by
characteristics
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. Each line
plots the point estimate for the difference in the average of a particular component of income between individuals who
were and weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the peak impact for that income source, after reweighting
individuals so that the distribution of observed characteristics matches that seen among the self employed. This comes
from dividing individuals into groups by sex, age band, and quartile of filing history. Observations are reweighted so
that the distribution across these discrete cells is the same as for the self-employed. Point estimates for the treatment
effect come from a weighted regression of each income component on dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit
for controls), dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls) interacted with treatment status, tax year
dummies, and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed a return in each of the four years before audit, with audit
status instrumented by selection for audit.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Appendix B Model details
In this Appendix we formalise the model described in Section 6.
B.1 Model outline
We consider an extended version of the model by Kleven et al. (2011), which is itself an extension
of the model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Taxpayers are risk-neutral, and choose how much
tax to evade.19 The probability of detection is endogenous and is increasing in the difference be-
tween reported and true income. The key idea underlying this assumption is that other contextual
information the tax authority might have, such as where a taxpayer lives, provides some information
on the taxpayer’s income, so that reports further from the truth are more likely to be investigated
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1987; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Sandmo, 2005; Kleven
et al., 2011). This is consistent with the objective of the tax authority: since not everyone can be
audited, larger deviations from the authority’s expectation are likely to yield the most revenue.
As noted in Section 6, the key innovation of our model is to note that incomes from some sources
are very autocorrelated (‘stable’), while other sources are much less stable. Extending the model
of Kleven et al. (2011) to multiple time periods, and incorporating differential autocorrelation of
income sources, allows us to distinguish different possible mechanisms for dynamic responses. The
importance of autocorrelation is that an audit provides a snapshot measure of the current true level
of income. For income sources which are relatively stable, this will also be a good predictor of
revenue in the future. For those which are less autocorrelated, the predictive power of this snapshot
will decline quickly over time. As we discuss below, different mechanisms make distinct predictions
about the dynamics of any audit impact split by autocorrelation of income source.
Consider a taxpayer with true income ỹs in year s. This income can be decomposed into three
parts: (i) a third party reported component, ỹTPRs ; (ii) a self-reported permanent component, ỹ
perm;
and (iii) a self-reported stochastic component, ỹstochs . The distinction between third-party reported
and self-reported income can explain why evasion rates appear much lower than would be expected
given the empirical probability of audit (Kleven et al., 2011). We distinguish within self-reported
income sources those which are fixed over time, and those which are time-varying. This is a sim-
19Relaxing risk-neutrality would reduce evasion. It could also introduce a positive correlation between the level
of income and evasion, assuming no outside wealth and decreasing absolute risk aversion. This is inconsistent with
what we see empirically in our data. Instead we see that there is little variation across the income distribution in the
probability of evasion (extensive margin) or the amount of tax evaded in cash terms (intensive margin). The latter
result means the share of income evaded is falling across the income distribution. See Figure A1 for details.
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plification for expositional purposes, but our main results can be generalised to having multiple
self-reported income sources with varying degrees of autocorrelation, as in our empirical setting.
In year s the taxpayer reports an income of ys, so evasion is es ..= ỹs − ys. Evasion is detected
with probability p(es), which is increasing in the level of evasion i.e. p
′(es) > 0. This is a composite
of both the probability of audit and of the audit successfully detecting evasion.
When evasion is detected, the taxpayer must pay the evaded tax and an additional penalty.
The tax is proportional to income, at rate τ , and the penalty is proportional to the tax evaded,
with penalty rate θ. The taxpayer’s problem is therefore to choose an evasion rate es to maximise
expected net-of-tax income:20
[
1− p(es)
][
(1− τ)ỹs + τes
]
+ p(es)
[
(1− τ)ỹs − θτes
]
(B1)
Differentiating with respect to evasion, es, gives the first order necessary condition for an interior
optimum: [
p(es) + p
′(es)es
]
(1 + θ) = 1 (B2)
Analysis of this problem is straightforward, and the literature studying this (from Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) onwards) has focused on comparative static predictions with respect to the proba-
bility that evasion is detected, the penalty for evasion, and the marginal tax rate.
In this context the main innovation of Kleven et al. (2011) is to note that attempts to evade
tax on third party reported income are highly unlikely to succeed. This is because matching of tax
returns and third party reports will detect any discrepancies, and auditing these returns will uncover
the evasion. On the other hand, evasion of self-reported income is much less likely to be noticed. To
capture this intuition, the authors first note that a taxpayer who wishes to evade should evade first
on the sources of income which are relatively less likely to be detected, before switching to the more
easily detected. This means that any evasion up to ỹselfs = ỹ
perm + ỹstochs should be of self-reported
income, and only after this will taxpayers evade by misreporting ỹTPRs . Given this optimal structure
for any evasion, the probability of detecting evasion is relatively low for es < ỹ
self
s , but then increases
quickly once es reaches ỹ
self
s . Finally, given these detection probabilities, the optimal strategy for a
taxpayer is to evade some amount less than ỹselfs .
20Here we present the taxpayer’s problem as a static decision, independent across periods. This simplifies exposition
and is equivalent to assuming that the tax authority can neither audit old tax returns when it selects a taxpayer for
audit, nor condition future audit probabilities on the outcomes of past audits. The latter assumption is an accurate
description of our empirical context.
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B.2 Implications of audit
Our insight builds directly on these ideas. Consider an individual who is audited (for the first time)
in year t. Until the time of audit his optimal reporting strategy was identical to that described above:
he evaded some amount less than the total amount of self-reported income he received, and none of
the misreporting related to third party reported income. There are three mechanisms that might
explain a change in reporting behaviour: (1) beliefs about the underlying audit rate or penalty for
evasion (‘belief updating’); (2) changes in the perceived reaudit risk following audit (‘reaudit risk’);
and (3) updates to the information held by the tax authority (‘information’).
In the first of these mechanisms, being audited (D = 1) changes the perceived audit rate or
penalty. Beliefs about the background audit rate or penalty depend on audit status, p(e,D) and
θ(D), and vary with audit status, p(e, 1) 6= p(e, 0) and θ(1) 6= θ(0). If this belief is revised upwards,
so θ(1) > θ(0), then the cost of evasion increases and evasion falls; if it is revised downwards then
the opposite occurs. Analagously for audit rate. Note that this does not require any particular
assumptions on either the initial beliefs or whether updating is rational. It is simply a statement of
the direction in which these beliefs about p and θ change. Absent any policy changes which shift
beliefs about the penalty rate, this change is permanent so any change in behaviour will also be
permanent. One might also expect that updating might be different for those who actually receive
penalties, compared to those who don’t. The effects we see empirically are not permanent, and they
do not differ between the non-compliant who do and do not receive penalties.
The second mechanism supposes instead that the perceived reaudit risk varies with time since
audit: p(es, h) varies with how many years it has been since audit, h = s − t. For a taxpayer that
has not yet been audited, h will be negative and p(es, h) will take the same value for all h < 0. If he
believes he is initially being monitored more carefully than before, so p(e, 1) ≥ p(e, 0), this leads to
higher compliance immediately after the audit. Alternatively if he believes he is now unlikely to be
audited for some time, the so-called ‘bomb crater effect’ (Mittone, 2006; Maciejovsky et al., 2007;
and Kastlunger et al., 2009), then p(e, 1) ≤ p(e, 0), and compliance initially falls. As time since
audit increases, the (perceived) effect of having just been audited wears off, so that beliefs about
the probability of evasion being detected converge back towards baseline i.e. |p(e, h+ 1)− p(e, 0)| ≤
|p(e, h) − p(e, 0)| for h > 0.21 Again this does not impose anything on where the perceived audit
probability comes from, only on how it is updated. The implication is that as the perceived probabilty
21Note that, given the risk-neutrality assumption, permanent shifts in the level of p(e, h) when h > 0 versus h ≤ 0
are observationally equivalent to a shift in θ. So any permanent shift in perceived audit probability, p(e, h)− p(e, 0)
as h → ∞ is observationally equivalent to some shift in the perceived penalty θ(1) − θ(0). This equivalence would
breakdown with risk aversion, which would allow separate testing of these hypotheses.
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of audit converges back to its initial level, the initial impact on reporting behaviour will decline back
to baseline. This convergence will be common across incomes from all sources since the probability
is common across them all. Again this mechanism does not explain our findings, since we see a
differential decline in reporting across income sources, even within individual. This is not consistent
with a response driven purely by a differential probability of audit in subsequent years. Instead
it can only be explained by a mechanism which leads to a differential shift in reporting behaviour
across income sources over time.
The final mechanism by which audits might affect reporting is that they provide information,
which differentially changes the ability to hide certain sources of income. Performing an audit pro-
vides the tax authority with more accurate information on a taxpayer’s income at a point in time. In
subsequent years, information from the audit will make evasion of more stable income sources easier
to detect. To operationalise this, recall our earlier distinction between the permanent and stochas-
tic components of self-reported income, {ỹperm, ỹstocht+h }. Once the tax authority performs audits a
taxpayer, ỹperm for that taxpayer is observed. After this, evasion of the permanent component of
income is easily detected, analogous to the case with third party reported income. Hence taxpayers
should now evade by misreporting ỹstocht+h before any misreporting of ỹ
perm (or ỹTPRt+h ).
Also, if this information is the mechanism by which misreporting can be uncovered, then as
the amount of the information about stochastic income is reduced over time, misreporting becomes
easier. In particular, information about past income is useful because the tax authority can compare
reported income in some period h to their expectation of income given the past observation in the
audit year. Such deviations will be more informative if past incomes are a good predictor of current
income i.e. the autocorrelation of stochastic income, ρ(h, stoch) = Corr(ỹstocht+h , ỹ
stoch
t ), is high. As h
increases, ρ(h, stoch) falls, so the ‘amount of information’ about current stochastic income is lower
and so misreporting becomes easier. The case of permanent income is the natural limit of this case,
where ρ(h,perm) = 1 ∀h. This also makes it clear that if multiple sources of stochastic income
were available, misreporting should increase more quickly for those sources which have a lower
autocorrelation. Hence under this mechanism, the prediction is that the initial impact on reporting
behaviour will decline back to baseline, and this decline will be more rapid for income sources which
have a lower autocorrelation. This is consistent with our findings, as seen in Figure 4.
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Appendix C Online Appendix: Additional Robustness Checks
In this Appendix we perform some additional robustness checks.
C.1 Stratified sampling of controls
In Section 4.1 we describe the procedure for constructing the control sample for the analysis. In
particular, since the treated sample was selected unconditionally randomly from those who could
have filed, we select six times as many controls as there are treated individuals unconditionally
randomly from the population of filers. However, due to the timing of audit selection, we note
that this creates some imbalance in filing history between those who were actually treated and the
controls we select.
To test whether this imbalance affects our main results, we here use an alternative approach to
constructing the control sample. In particular, we perform stratified random sampling using filing
history to stratify the population.22 To do this we partition the population of individuals observed in
a given year into groups by the number of years they have previously filed, plus a group combining
‘more than four’ into a single category.23 For each treated individual we then select six control
individuals with the same filing history.
Table C1 shows the results of the balancing tests for the new sample. Using the stratified random
sampling procedure now achieves a match on ‘survives’ – presence in the data in the years before
audit – on which stratification was conditioned, as well as maintaining the balance on other variables.
Table C2 compares the results from using this stratified random sample (Column 2) to the
previous results from the unconditional random sample control group (Column 1). Point estimates
and standard errors are broadly similar, as is the overall dynamic of the results. The two sets of
results are never statistically significantly different from each other, although the new results imply
a slightly lower tax take: the dynamic effect over the subsequent five years is £1060 rather than
£1230.
22We thank a referee for this suggestion.
23More precisely, they are assigned the maximum number of years ago they were first observed to file, with first
observed more than four years ago combined with those first observed four years ago.
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Table C1: Sample balance, using stratified random sampling to construct
control sample
Years after audit -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Characteristics
Female Mean .285 .277 .275 .277 .277
Difference -.006 -.006 -.004 -.005 -.004
p-value .171 .209 .282 .289 .369
Age Mean 49.9 49.9 49.6 49.6 49.3
Difference .081 .115 .072 .065 .142
p-value .157 .141 .132 .146 .075
In London or SE Mean .320 .344 .362 .281 .302
Difference -.005 0 .003 .003 .003
p-value .152 .115 .11 .182 .2
Has tax agent Mean .688 .689 .692 .684 .687
Difference -.003 -.005 0 .003 .003
p-value .493 .358 .14 .134 .412
Survives Mean .647 .723 .79 .866 .945
Difference -.001 -.003 -.002 -.002 0
p-value .974 .918 .997 .997 1
Income and tax totals
Total taxable income Mean 24,820 26,746 29,046 30,278 32,023
Diff 77 -140 -284 492 550
p value .879 .675 .087 .074 .268
Total tax Mean 6,333 6,705 7,334 7,490 7,898
Diff 4 -91 -148 146 170
p value .925 .626 .064 .186 .413
Income components
Employment Mean 15,457 16,533 17,848 18,645 19,646
Diff -297 -343 -264 384 364
p value .169 .508 .062 .052 .317
Self employment Mean 3,663 4,088 4,478 4,636 4,774
Diff 137 116 14 -5 70
p value .058 .527 .47 .394 .395
Interest and dividends Mean 2,393 2,765 2,856 2,982 3,133
Diff -67 30 -42 -44 12
p value .664 .927 .651 .098 .499
Pensions Mean 1,897 2,172 2,415 2,680 2,955
Diff 163 164 143 164 174
p value .124 .202 .297 .122 .108
Property Mean 500 510 561 559 570
Diff 5 -5 16 29 31
p value .677 .424 .768 .823 .455
Notes: The control group is selected by stratified random sampling from the population of individuals who could have
been selected for audit but were not, and stratification is based on filing history to match the treatment group. ‘Years
after audit’ measures time relative to audit, or placebo audit for controls. ‘Mean’ is the mean outcome in the control
(not selected for audit) group across all years. ‘Difference’ is the coefficient on the treatment dummy in a regression
of the outcome on a treatment dummy. Treatment dummy equals 1 if taxpayer was selected by HMRC for a random
audit. p-values are derived from an F-test that coefficients on interactions between treatment and tax year dummies
are all zero in a regression of the outcome of interest on tax year dummies, interactions between treatment and tax
year dummies. This is a stronger test than just testing the coefficient on treatment not interacted. Differences in
control means between this table and Table 3 are driven by no longer conditioning on survives = 1; scaling by survives
gives comparable point estimates. Monetary values are in 2012 prices. Standard errors are clustered by taxpayer.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Table C2: Dynamic effect of audit, using different control groups
Sampling
Years since (1) (2)
audit Unconditional Stratified
-5 60.1 38.8
(54) (54.7)
-4 44.7 25.8
(37.3) (38.4)
-3 -55.4 -58
(30.1) (30.5)
-2 10.6 12.1
(31.3) (31.9)
-1 6.6 19.7
(40) (40.8)
0 85.3 105.3
(53.8) (54.2)
1 137.6* 139.4*
(64) (64.1)
2 376.8*** 386.4***
(69.9) (69.8)
3 288.4*** 251.9***
(72.2) (72.3)
4 203.8** 133.8
(78.6) (79.1)
5 221.8** 151.4
(85.6) (86.1)
6 105.6 58.3
(92.5) (93.4)
7 141.6 75.5
(108.9) (109.5)
8 52.1 -27.6
(138.3) (139.9)
N 2,492,210 2,502,906
Notes: Coefficients show the average difference in reported tax between individuals selected for audit, and control
individuals, at different points in time relative to audit (or placebo audit for controls). Column (1) uses as controls
an unconditional random sample selected from the population of taxpayers who could have been selected for audit
but were not. Results come from a regression of reported tax on treatment group selection interacted with time since
audit, and dummies for filing history. Column (2) uses as controls a stratified random sample of indivduals who
could have been selected for audit but were not, where stratification is done on filing history and sampling rates are
selected to match the treatment group. Results come from a regression of reported tax on treatment group selection
interacted with time since audit. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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C.2 Adjusting trimming
In our main results we show the impact of audits trimming the top 1% of observations, to reduce
noise. Since our sample is composed of the population of tax filers, and only a third of UK taxpayers
had to file in this period (the rest are sufficiently covered by withholding at source), this implies
trimming roughly the top 0.3% of incomes. Given the skewness of income distributions – see Advani
and Summers (2020) for more information about measurement of UK top incomes using these data
– trimming substantially reduces noise. To ensure that it does not also substantially change our
results, we show below the results of alternative levels of trimming: no trimming, 0.5% trimming,
1% (the benchmark shown in the main text), and 2.5%.
As can be seen from the results in the table, varying the levels of trimming does not cause much
change in the overall shape or magnitudes of these effects. The precise profile of effects changes
slightly, though not in a monotone way. The peak is always two years after the year selected for
audit. With less trimming than 1% the dynamic effects still decline over the same horizon, though
not always as smoothly, and standard errors are larger as expected. With more trimming the
same dynamics are seen as at 1%. In each of the cases considered, the results are not statistically
significantly different from those in the main specification.
It is important to note again here that the comparison made in our context is between receipt
of a random audit and business-as-usual. To the extent that those reporting the highest, and most
complex, incomes are more likely to be selected for a targeted audit, the shift in audit probability
for these individuals will be small. Hence we should not expect the treatment of these observations
in the analysis (exclusion or inclusion) to substantially change the results observed.
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Table C3: Impact of audits on reported tax owed, at different levels of
trimming
Level of trimming
Years since (1) (2) (3) (4)
audit 0% 0.5% 1% 2.5%
-5 37.6 33.3 60.1 36.8
(85.7) (70.2) (54.0) (44.6)
-4 -10.5 3.2 44.7 38.0
(57.9) (48.4) (37.3) (30.3)
-3 -94.0 -84.0* -55.4 -54.4*
(48.0) (39.8) (30.1) (24.9)
-2 22.3 15.8 10.6 2.4
(50.0) (41.0) (31.3) (25.4)
-1 88.2 71.4 6.6 19.4
(62.8) (52.0) (40.0) (33.0)
0 90.0 82.5 85.3 70.4
(86.0) (69.4) (53.8) (43.2)
1 123.6 119.4 137.6* 149.5**
(97.2) (80.4) (64.0) (52.4)
2 333.2** 327.4*** 376.8*** 345.8***
(105.2) (88.8) (69.9) (56.8)
3 193.6 208.5* 288.4*** 208.7***
(110.5) (91.3) (72.2) (58.2)
4 235.8 215.9* 203.8** 200.7**
(124.4) (102.6) (78.6) (64.8)
5 160.1 188.4 221.8** 141.5*
(132.4) (111.8) (85.6) (69.7)
6 26.9 15.3 105.6 93.8
(145.5) (120.5) (92.5) (74.9)
7 36.8 85.4 141.6 153.6
(167.0) (139.4) (108.9) (86.6)
8 46.3 60.3 52.1 47.7
(215.2) (183.1) (138.3) (112.9)
N 2,519,604 2,509,367 2,492,210 2,462,362
Notes: Coefficients show the average difference in reported tax between individuals selected for audit, and control
individuals, at different points in time relative to audit (or placebo audit for controls). Different columns allow for
different levels of trimming: Column (1) uses no trimming, Column (2) trims the top 0.5% of individuals, Column
(3) shows our baseline specification of 1% trimming, and Column (4) trims the top 2.5%. Controls are based on an
unconditional random sample selected from the population of taxpayers who could have been selected for audit but
were not. Results come from a regression of the income variable on treatment group selection interacted with time
since audit, and dummies for filing history. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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C.3 Comparing risk of audit between treatment and control
As noted in Section 2, the control group continue to face the background risk of receiving an op-
erational audit. One natural question this raises is whether, after audit, there is a change in audit
risk for the treatment group relative to the controls. For example, if those selected for a random
audit were subsequently at higher risk of reaudit, then this might explain some of the dynamics
we observe. Figure C1 shows the difference in audit probability between the treatment and control
groups. We see that in the years before selection (or not) for a random audit, the two groups were
equally likely to have been selected for an audit i.e. operational audits were equally common for
the two groups prior to selection for a random audit. In the audit year, which is excluded from
the figure for readability, the point estimate for the difference in audit probability jumps to 98.1%
(s.e. 0.1%), indicating that while 100% of the treated group are selected for an audit, around 2%
of the controls are also. In the following years the difference is again fractions of a percent, and
not significantly different from zero except in year 6 (point estimate 0.01%, p-value 2%). This lack
of difference in audit selection probability, except in the year explicitly selected for random audit,
implies differences in outcomes are not driven by differences in audit risk.
Figure C1: Difference in audit probability between treated and controls
x‘’ Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control
individuals who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to
2011/12. The solid line plots the point estimate for the difference in share of each group given an audit, for different
numbers of years after the random audit (excluding zero). This comes from a linear regression of being selected for
audit on dummies for years since audit (or placebo audit for controls), dummies for years since audit (or placebo
audit for controls) interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed a
return in each of the four years before audit. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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C.4 Understanding audit timing
As noted in Section 3.1, there are substantial lags between the tax year that is being audited, filing a
return for that tax year, and subsequently receiving information that an audit for that year is taking
place. One might think that some of the dynamics seen in Figure 2 are therefore driven simply by
the timing of audits. However, naively using the time when an audit is actually opened risks creating
bias, since the timing of opening among the selected is likely non-random. An alternative therefore
is to estimate the timing of audit opening among the treatment group, and then use the mean and
distribution of residuals to impute the timing of opening for the controls, with the same distribution
of opening timing as for the treatment group.24 We predict the timing of opening using only the tax
year selected for audit. Other available characteristics are likely to be correlated also with outcomes
and hence be endogenous. Whilst this might not be problematic if the same correlation held among
the controls, since some controls are actually audited (as noted previously they may still receive
targeted audits), our results would then become sensitive to correctly matching these controls with
the treated individuals who would have been selected for a targeted audit. Further, those randomly
audited individuals who would otherwise have been selected for a targeted audit (about 60 per year)
would also need to have the same realised characteristics distribution as the audited individuals
in the controls. Given the bias that would be caused if this were not to hold, we instead exclude
potentially endogenous individual characteristics.
Figure C2 shows the results of this estimation, implementing the same specification as in the
main results but using the adjusted timing of h = 0 in the tax year in which audit is predicted to
be opened. There are three points to note. First, we see that the effect now peaks in year zero, and
this peak is similar in magnitude to the peak previously seen in Figure 2. Second, there is some
effect now in the year before the audit is opened. This suggests the effects we are observing are
driven by reporting rather than real effects: many individuals will not have filed the previous years
tax when the audit is opened, since the filing deadline is around 10 months after the end of the
tax year. Hence these individuals are responding to an audit in the current tax year by increasing
reporting for the previous, unfiled tax year. Third, we again see a slow decline over the subsequent
seven years. The dynamics we see are therefore not purely an artefact of audit timing.
24We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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Figure C2: Dynamic effect of audits on total reported tax owed, measuring
time since audit predicted to have been opened
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. The
solid line plots the point estimate for the difference in average ‘total reported tax’ between individuals who were and
weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the tax year in which the audit is predicted to have opened.
This comes from a regression of total reported tax on dummies for years since predicted audit opening, dummies for
years since opening interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and dummies for whether the taxpayer filed
a return in each of the four years before audit, with audit status instrumented by selection for audit. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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C.5 Understanding audit timing by income source
The previous section studied the dynamics of reported tax owed over the years after predicted audit
opening, rather than after the tax year in which selection for audit was made (as in the main text).
The peak was seen to be in the predicted year of opening. In this section we perform the same
exercise, but looking across income sources. Figure C3 repeats Figure 4, but now looking at time
since audit was predicted to be opened.
As before the same pattern of results is seen. Relative to the initial impact in the predicted
year of opening, pension income – which is highly autocorrelated – does not subsequently appear
to decline at all. Property income and employment income are the next most autocorrelated, and
decline relatively slowly. Self-employment and dividend income are least autocorrelated and decline
most quickly.
Figure C3: Relative dynamics by income source, over time since predicted
audit opening
Notes: Sample includes individuals selected for a random audit between 1998/99 and 2008/09, and control individuals
who could have been selected in the same years but were not. It uses tax returns from 1998/99 to 2011/12. Each
line plots the point estimate for the difference in the average of a particular component of income between individuals
who were and weren’t audited, for different numbers of years after the tax year in which the audit is predicted to have
opened. This comes from a regression of each income component on dummies for years since predicted audit opening,
dummies for years since opening interacted with treatment status, tax year dummies, and dummies for whether the
taxpayer filed a return in each of the four years before audit, with audit status instrumented by selection for audit.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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C.6 Comparing stable and unstable income sources
In Section 4.3 we note that one concern about the results from comparing across income sources
(Figure 4) is that these measures are noisy, so if confidence intervals were added many would overlap.
One way we tackled that is to formally test that less autocorrelated sources declined faster than
more autocorrelated ones, using pairwise comparisons within individual.
Another approach, which we show here, is to divide income sources up into two categories: stable
(employment, property, pensions) and unstable (self-employment, dividends). For each individual,
we normalise both stable and unstable income by the value it took in the year selected for audit
– this ensures that results between stable and unstable are comparable despite the different ab-
solute amounts of income. We then perform the same analysis as in the main results, comparing
stable/unstable income between those randomly selected for treatment, and those randomly not se-
lected. Table C4 shows the results, which can be interpreted as the proportional increase in reported
stable/unstable income.
We see that this peaks in year 2, for both stable and unstable sources. The peak is higher
for unstable income sources, and declines more rapidly. Fewer individuals report any amount of
unstable income, and there is naturally more variation in these income sources, so the standard
errors are larger. In this specification, stable income sources are statistically significantly higher
among those audited until five years after the year selected for audit. For unstable sources they
are never statistically significantly different from zero, even at the peak where the point estimate is
larger than for stable income. In the point estimates there is a clear pattern of sharp decline as seen
previously.
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Table C4: Impact of audit by stability of income source
Sampling
Years since (1) (2)
audit Stable Unstable
-5 -.007 .017
(.005) (.017)
-4 .004 .003
(.003) (.014)
-3 -.005 -.006
(.003) (.012)
-2 .003 .004
(.003) (.014)
-1 -.001 -.001
(.003) (.017)
0 .000 .017
(.004) (.015)
1 .007 .007
(.006) (.024)
2 .025*** .032
(.007) (.026)
3 .016* .015
(.007) (.027)
4 .016* .009
(.007) (.032)
5 .016* .010
(.008) (.034)
6 .012 -.006
(.009) (.035)
7 .013 .014
(.010) (.040)
8 -.001 .104
(.012) (.061)
N 1,505,826 428,526
Notes: Coefficients show the average difference in income between individuals selected for audit, and control indi-
viduals, at different points in time relative to audit (or placebo audit for controls). Column (1) uses the sum of all
stable income sources – employment, property, and pensions – as the outcome variable. Column (2) uses the sum
of all unstable income sources – self-employment and dividends – as the outcome variable. Controls are based on an
unconditional random sample selected from the population of taxpayers who could have been selected for audit but
were not. Results come from a regression of the income variable on treatment group selection interacted with time
since audit, and dummies for filing history. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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